Option Trading Hedge Fund

Hedge Fund BREAKING DOWN Hedge Fund Setiap dana lindung nilai dibangun untuk memanfaatkan peluang pasar yang dapat diidentifikasi. Hedge fund menggunakan strategi investasi yang berbeda dan karenanya sering diklasifikasikan menurut gaya investasi. Ada keragaman yang besar dalam atribut risiko dan investasi di antara gaya. Secara hukum, dana lindung nilai paling sering ditetapkan sebagai kemitraan terbatas investasi swasta yang terbuka untuk sejumlah investor terakreditasi dan memerlukan investasi minimum awal yang besar. Investasi pada hedge fund tidak likuid karena mereka sering meminta investor menyimpan uang mereka di dana setidaknya selama satu tahun, yang dikenal sebagai periode lock-up. Penarikan juga mungkin hanya terjadi pada interval tertentu seperti kuartalan atau bi-tahunan. Sejarah Hedge Fund Mantan penulis dan sosiolog perusahaan Alfred Winslow Joness, A. W. Jones amp Co. meluncurkan hedge fund pertama di tahun 1949. Saat menulis artikel tentang tren investasi saat ini untuk Fortune pada tahun 1948, Jones terinspirasi untuk mencoba menangani uang. Dia mengumpulkan 100.000 (termasuk 40.000 dari kantongnya sendiri) dan bertekad untuk meminimalkan risiko memegang posisi saham jangka panjang dengan menjual short stock lain. Inovasi investasi ini sekarang disebut sebagai model ekuitas longshort klasik. Jones juga menggunakan leverage untuk meningkatkan return. Pada tahun 1952, Jones mengubah struktur kendaraan investasinya. Mengubahnya dari kemitraan umum menjadi kemitraan terbatas dan menambahkan 20 biaya insentif sebagai kompensasi bagi mitra pengelola. Sebagai manajer uang pertama yang menggabungkan short selling, penggunaan leverage, risiko bersama melalui kemitraan dengan investor lain dan sistem kompensasi berdasarkan kinerja investasi, Jones mendapatkan tempatnya dalam menginvestasikan sejarah sebagai bapak hedge fund. Hedge funds secara dramatis mengungguli reksa dana paling banyak di tahun 1960an dan mendapatkan popularitas lebih lanjut ketika sebuah artikel di Fortune 1966 menyoroti investasi yang tidak jelas yang mengungguli setiap reksa dana di pasar dengan angka dua digit selama setahun terakhir dan dengan digit dua digit tinggi Selama lima tahun terakhir Namun, karena tren hedge fund berkembang, dalam upaya memaksimalkan imbal hasil, banyak dana beralih dari strategi Jones, yang berfokus pada pemetikan saham ditambah dengan lindung nilai dan memilih untuk melakukan strategi berisiko berdasarkan pengaruh jangka panjang. Taktik ini menyebabkan kerugian besar pada tahun 1969-70, diikuti oleh sejumlah penutupan hedge fund selama pasar bear 1973-74. Industri ini relatif sepi selama lebih dari dua dekade sampai sebuah artikel tahun 1986 di Institutional Investor memuji kinerja dua digit Dana Harimau Julian Robertson. Dengan dana lindung nilai terbang tinggi sekali lagi menarik perhatian publik dengan kinerja yang luar biasa, para investor berbondong-bondong ke industri yang sekarang menawarkan ribuan dana dan serangkaian strategi eksotis yang terus meningkat, termasuk perdagangan mata uang dan derivatif seperti futures dan opsi. Manajer uang profil tinggi meninggalkan industri reksa dana tradisional berbondong-bondong pada awal 1990-an, mencari ketenaran dan keberuntungan sebagai manajer hedge fund. Sayangnya, sejarah mengulanginya sendiri di akhir 1990an dan memasuki awal tahun 2000an karena sejumlah dana lindung nilai profil tinggi, termasuk Robertsons, gagal dalam mode spektakuler. Sejak era itu, industri hedge fund tumbuh dengan pesat. Saat ini industri hedge fund adalah aset massivetotal under management di industri ini yang bernilai lebih dari 3,2 triliun menurut Laporan Preqin Global Hedge Fund 2016. Jumlah dana lindung operasi juga tumbuh. Ada sekitar 2.000 hedge fund pada tahun 2002. Jumlah tersebut meningkat menjadi lebih dari 10.000 pada tahun 2015. Namun, pada tahun 2016, jumlah hedge fund saat ini kembali menurun menurut data dari Hedge Fund Research. Berikut adalah deskripsi karakteristik umum untuk hedge fund kontemporer. Karakteristik Utama Hedge Fund 1. Mereka hanya terbuka untuk investor terakreditasi atau berkualitas: Dana Hedge hanya diperbolehkan untuk mengambil uang dari investor yang memenuhi syarat dengan pendapatan tahunan yang melebihi 200.000 selama dua tahun terakhir atau senilai bersih melebihi 1 juta, tidak termasuk hak utama mereka. tempat tinggal. Dengan demikian, Komisi Sekuritas dan Bursa Efek menganggap investor cukup memenuhi syarat untuk menangani potensi risiko yang berasal dari mandat investasi yang lebih luas. 2. Mereka menawarkan lintang investasi yang lebih luas daripada dana lainnya: Jelajah investasi hedge fund hanya dibatasi oleh mandatnya. Sebuah hedge fund pada dasarnya dapat berinvestasi di bidang apapun, real estat. Saham, derivatif. Dan mata uang. Reksa dana, sebaliknya, pada dasarnya harus berpegang pada saham atau obligasi, dan biasanya hanya berjangka panjang. 3. Mereka sering menggunakan leverage: Hedge fund akan sering menggunakan uang pinjaman untuk memperkuat keuntungan mereka. Seperti yang kita lihat selama krisis keuangan tahun 2008. leverage juga bisa menghapus dana lindung nilai. 4. Struktur biaya: Daripada hanya menagih rasio biaya, hedge fund mengenakan biaya rasio biaya dan biaya kinerja. Struktur biaya ini dikenal sebagai biaya pengelolaan aset Two and Twentya 2 dan kemudian 20 potongan keuntungan yang dihasilkan. Ada karakteristik yang lebih spesifik yang menentukan hedge fund, namun pada dasarnya, karena mereka adalah kendaraan investasi swasta yang hanya memungkinkan individu kaya untuk berinvestasi, hedge fund dapat cukup banyak melakukan apa yang mereka inginkan selama mereka mengungkapkan strategi yang dimuka kepada investor. Lintang lebar ini mungkin terdengar sangat berisiko, dan terkadang juga bisa terjadi. Beberapa pukulan finansial paling spektakuler melibatkan hedge fund. Konon, fleksibilitas yang diberikan untuk melakukan lindung nilai terhadap dana telah menghasilkan beberapa manajer uang paling berbakat yang menghasilkan beberapa keuntungan jangka panjang yang menakjubkan. Dana lindung nilai pertama didirikan pada akhir 1940-an sebagai kendaraan ekuitas lindung nilai longshort. Baru-baru ini, investor institusional dana pensiun perusahaan dan masyarakat. Wakaf dan kepercayaan. Dan departemen kepercayaan bank mencakup dana lindung nilai sebagai satu segmen portofolio terdiversifikasi dengan baik. Penting untuk dicatat bahwa lindung nilai sebenarnya adalah praktik untuk mencoba mengurangi risiko, namun tujuan kebanyakan hedge fund adalah memaksimalkan laba atas investasi. Nama tersebut sebagian besar bersifat historis, karena hedge fund pertama mencoba melakukan lindung nilai terhadap risiko penurunan pasar beruang dengan mengkonsorskan pasar. (Reksadana umumnya tidak masuk ke posisi short sebagai salah satu tujuan utama mereka). Saat ini, hedge fund menggunakan lusinan strategi yang berbeda, sehingga tidak tepat untuk mengatakan bahwa hedge fund hanya melindungi risiko. Padahal, karena pengelola hedge fund melakukan investasi spekulatif, dana ini bisa membawa risiko lebih dari keseluruhan pasar. Berikut adalah beberapa risiko hedge fund: 1. Strategi investasi yang terkonsentrasi menunjukkan hedge fund terhadap kerugian yang berpotensi besar. 2. Hedge fund biasanya mengharuskan investor untuk mengunci uang untuk jangka waktu beberapa tahun. 3. Penggunaan leverage, atau uang pinjaman, bisa mengubah apa yang akan menjadi kerugian kecil menjadi kerugian yang signifikan. Strategi Hedge Fund Ada banyak strategi yang manajer gunakan tapi di bawah ini adalah gambaran umum strategi umum. Ekuitas pasar netral. Dana ini mencoba untuk mengidentifikasi overvalued dan undervalued equity securities sementara menetralisir portofolio risiko pasar dengan menggabungkan posisi long dan short. Portofolio biasanya terstruktur untuk pasar, industri, sektor, dan dolar netral, dengan portofolio beta sekitar nol. Hal ini dilakukan dengan memegang posisi ekuitas yang panjang dan pendek dengan eksposur yang hampir sama dengan faktor pasar atau sektor terkait. Karena gaya ini mencari kembali yang absolut. Patokan biasanya adalah tingkat bebas risiko. Arbitrase konversi Strategi ini mencoba memanfaatkan mis-pricings dalam corporate convertible securities. Seperti obligasi konversi. Waran. Dan saham preferen yang dapat dikonversi Manajer dalam kategori ini membeli atau menjual sekuritas ini dan kemudian melakukan lindung nilai sebagian atau seluruh risiko yang terkait. Contoh paling sederhana adalah membeli obligasi konversi dan melakukan lindung nilai atas komponen ekuitas risiko obligasi dengan mengkonsletkan saham yang bersangkutan. Selain mengumpulkan kupon obligasi konversi yang mendasarinya. Strategi arbitrase konversi bisa menghasilkan uang jika volatilitas yang diharapkan dari underlying asset meningkat karena opsi yang disematkan. Atau jika harga underlying asset meningkat dengan cepat. Bergantung pada strategi lindung nilai, strategi juga akan menghasilkan uang jika kualitas kredit emiten meningkat. Arbitrase pendapatan tetap: Dana ini berusaha untuk mengidentifikasi sekuritas pendapatan tetap (overvalued dan undervalued fixed-income securities) yang sebagian besar didasarkan pada ekspektasi perubahan dalam struktur jangka atau kualitas kredit dari berbagai isu terkait atau sektor pasar. Portofolio pendapatan tetap umumnya dinetralkan terhadap pergerakan pasar terarah karena portofolio menggabungkan posisi long dan short, oleh karena itu durasi portofolio mendekati nol. Efek tertekan. Portofolio surat berharga tertekan diinvestasikan baik dalam hutang dan ekuitas perusahaan yang berada dalam atau mendekati kebangkrutan. Sebagian besar investor tidak siap menghadapi kesulitan hukum dan negosiasi dengan kreditor dan penggugat lainnya yang biasa terjadi pada perusahaan yang tertekan. Investor tradisional lebih suka mengalihkan risiko tersebut kepada orang lain saat perusahaan berada dalam bahaya default. Selanjutnya, banyak investor dicegah untuk memegang sekuritas yang berada dalam kondisi default atau berisiko gagal bayar. Karena relatif tidak likuiditasnya hutang dan ekuitas yang tertekan, penjualan pendek sulit dilakukan, sehingga sebagian besar dana long. Merger arbitrase. Merger arbitrase, juga disebut arbitrase kesepakatan, berusaha untuk menangkap spread harga antara harga pasar saat ini dari sekuritas perusahaan dan nilainya setelah berhasil menyelesaikan pengambilalihan, merger, spin-off, atau transaksi serupa yang melibatkan lebih dari satu perusahaan. Dalam arbitrase merger, kesempatan biasanya melibatkan pembelian saham perusahaan target setelah pengumuman merger dan korslet sejumlah saham perusahaan yang mengakuisisi. Hedged equity: Hedge equity strategies berusaha untuk mengidentifikasi overvalued dan undervalued equity securities. Portofolio biasanya tidak terstruktur untuk pasar, industri, sektor, dan dolar netral, dan mungkin sangat terkonsentrasi. Misalnya, nilai posisi pendek mungkin hanya sebagian kecil dari nilai posisi long dan portofolio mungkin memiliki eksposur jangka panjang terhadap pasar ekuitas. Hedged equity adalah strategi pelonggaran hedge fund terbesar dalam hal pengelolaan aset. Hal ini juga dikenal sebagai strategi ekuitas longshort. Makro global Strategi makro global terutama berusaha untuk mengambil keuntungan dari pergerakan sistematis di pasar keuangan dan non-keuangan utama melalui perdagangan mata uang. Kontrak berjangka, dan pilihan, meskipun mereka mungkin juga mengambil posisi utama di pasar ekuitas dan obligasi tradisional. Untuk sebagian besar, mereka berbeda dari strategi hedge fund tradisional karena mereka berkonsentrasi pada tren pasar utama daripada pada peluang keamanan individual. Banyak manajer makro global menggunakan derivatif, seperti futures dan options. Dalam strategi mereka Dikelola masa depan kadang diklasifikasikan berdasarkan makro global sebagai hasilnya. Pasar negara berkembang. Dana ini berfokus pada pasar yang baru muncul dan kurang matang. Karena short selling tidak diijinkan di sebagian besar pasar negara berkembang dan karena futures dan options mungkin tidak tersedia, dana ini cenderung panjang. Dana dana: Dana dana (FOF) adalah dana yang berinvestasi pada sejumlah dana pelindung yang mendasarinya. FOF khas berinvestasi pada 10-30 hedge fund dan beberapa FOFs bahkan lebih beragam. Meskipun investor FOF dapat mencapai diversifikasi antara manajer dan strategi hedge fund, mereka harus membayar dua lapis biaya: satu ke pengelola dana lindung nilai. Dan yang lainnya ke manajer FOF. FOF biasanya lebih mudah diakses oleh investor perorangan dan lebih likuid. Hedge Fund Manager Pay Structure Manajer hedge fund terkenal dengan tipikal 2 dan 20 struktur pembayaran dimana manajer investasi menerima 2 aset dan 20 keuntungan setiap tahunnya. Its 2 yang mendapat kritik, dan tidak sulit untuk melihat mengapa. Sekalipun pengelola dana lindung nilai kehilangan uang, dia tetap mendapat 2 aset. Sebagai contoh, seorang manajer yang mengawasi dana 1 miliar dapat mengantongi kompensasi 20 juta setahun tanpa mengangkat satu jari pun. Konon, ada mekanisme yang disiapkan untuk membantu melindungi mereka yang berinvestasi pada dana lindung nilai. Sering kali, batasan biaya seperti tanda air tinggi digunakan untuk mencegah manajer portofolio mendapat bayaran dengan pengembalian yang sama dua kali. Cap biaya juga mungkin ada untuk mencegah para manajer mengambil risiko berlebih. Cara Memilih Hedge Fund Dengan begitu banyak hedge fund di dunia investasi, penting bagi investor untuk mengetahui apa yang mereka cari untuk merampingkan proses due diligence dan membuat keputusan tepat waktu dan tepat. Saat mencari hedge fund berkualitas tinggi, penting bagi investor untuk mengidentifikasi metrik yang penting bagi mereka dan hasilnya diperlukan untuk masing-masing. Pedoman ini dapat didasarkan pada nilai absolut, seperti pengembalian yang melebihi 20 per tahun selama lima tahun sebelumnya, atau dapat relatif, seperti lima besar dana berkinerja tertinggi dalam kategori tertentu. Panduan Kinerja Mutlak Panduan pertama yang harus ditetapkan investor saat memilih dana adalah tingkat pengembalian tahunan. Katakanlah bahwa kita ingin mencari dana dengan pengembalian tahunan lima tahun yang melebihi tingkat pengembalian Indeks Obligasi Pemerintah Citigroup World (WGBI) sebesar 1. Filter ini akan menghilangkan semua dana yang kinerjanya kurang baik dalam jangka waktu lama, dan bisa juga Disesuaikan berdasarkan kinerja indeks dari waktu ke waktu. Pedoman ini juga akan mengungkapkan dana dengan tingkat pengembalian yang diharapkan jauh lebih tinggi, seperti dana makro global, dana longshort jangka panjang, dan beberapa lainnya. Tetapi jika ini adalah jenis dana yang dicari investor, maka mereka juga harus menetapkan pedoman untuk standar deviasi. Sekali lagi, kita akan menggunakan WGBI untuk menghitung deviasi standar untuk indeks selama lima tahun sebelumnya. Mari kita asumsikan kita menambahkan 1 pada hasil ini, dan menetapkan nilai tersebut sebagai pedoman untuk standar deviasi. Dana dengan standar deviasi lebih besar dari pada pedoman juga bisa dieliminasi dari pertimbangan lebih lanjut. Sayangnya, imbal hasil yang tinggi belum tentu membantu untuk mengidentifikasi dana yang menarik. Dalam beberapa kasus, hedge fund mungkin menggunakan strategi yang mendukung, yang mendorong kinerja lebih tinggi dari biasanya untuk kategori. Oleh karena itu, setelah dana tertentu diidentifikasi sebagai pemain dengan return tinggi, penting untuk mengidentifikasi strategi dana dan membandingkan imbal hasil dengan dana lain dalam kategori yang sama. Untuk melakukan ini, investor dapat menetapkan pedoman dengan terlebih dahulu menghasilkan analisis rekan tentang dana serupa. Misalnya, seseorang bisa membentuk persentil ke-50 sebagai pedoman untuk menyaring dana. Sekarang seorang investor memiliki dua pedoman yang harus dipenuhi oleh semua dana untuk dipertimbangkan lebih lanjut. Namun, menerapkan kedua pedoman ini masih menyisakan terlalu banyak dana untuk dievaluasi dalam jumlah waktu yang wajar. Panduan tambahan perlu ditetapkan, namun panduan tambahan tidak akan selalu berlaku di seluruh jagat dana yang tersisa. Misalnya, pedoman untuk dana arbitrase merger akan berbeda dari dana jangka pendek yang netral. Pedoman Kinerja Relatif Untuk memudahkan investor mencari dana berkualitas tinggi yang tidak hanya memenuhi pedoman pengembalian dan risiko awal tetapi juga memenuhi panduan spesifik strategi, langkah selanjutnya adalah menetapkan satu set pedoman relatif. Metrik kinerja relatif harus selalu didasarkan pada kategori atau strategi tertentu. Misalnya, tidak adil membandingkan dana makro global leverage dengan dana ekuitas longgar pasar-netral. Untuk menetapkan panduan untuk strategi tertentu, investor dapat menggunakan paket perangkat lunak analitis (seperti Morningstar) untuk pertama-tama mengidentifikasi sekumpulan dana dengan menggunakan strategi serupa. Kemudian, analisis rekan akan mengungkapkan banyak statistik, dipecah menjadi kuartil atau desil. Untuk alam semesta itu. Ambang batas untuk setiap pedoman mungkin merupakan hasil untuk setiap metrik yang memenuhi atau melebihi persentil ke-50. Seorang investor dapat melonggarkan pedoman dengan menggunakan persentil ke-60 atau mengencangkan pedoman dengan menggunakan persentil ke-40. Menggunakan persentil ke-50 di semua metrik biasanya menyaring semua kecuali beberapa dana lindung nilai untuk pertimbangan tambahan. Selain itu, menetapkan pedoman dengan cara ini memungkinkan fleksibilitas untuk menyesuaikan pedoman karena lingkungan ekonomi dapat mempengaruhi tingkat pengembalian mutlak untuk beberapa strategi. Berikut adalah daftar suara metrik utama yang digunakan untuk menetapkan pedoman: Hasil pengembalian tahunan lima tahun Penyimpangan standar Rolling standard deviation Months to recoverymaximum drawdown Downside deviation Panduan ini akan membantu menghilangkan banyak dana di alam semesta dan mengidentifikasi sejumlah dana yang dapat dikerjakan untuk analisis lebih lanjut. Seorang investor mungkin juga ingin mempertimbangkan panduan lain yang dapat mengurangi jumlah dana untuk dianalisis atau untuk mengidentifikasi dana yang memenuhi kriteria tambahan yang mungkin relevan bagi investor. Beberapa contoh panduan lainnya meliputi: Ukuran DanaFirm Ukuran: Pedoman untuk ukuran mungkin minimal atau maksimal tergantung pada preferensi investor. Misalnya, investor institusional sering menginvestasikan dana dalam jumlah besar sehingga dana atau perusahaan harus memiliki ukuran minimum untuk mengakomodasi investasi besar. Bagi investor lain, dana yang terlalu besar mungkin menghadapi tantangan masa depan dengan menggunakan strategi yang sama untuk mencocokkan kesuksesan masa lalu. Begitulah kasus hedge fund yang berinvestasi di small-cap equity space. Track Record: Jika investor menginginkan dana untuk memiliki track record minimum 24 atau 36 bulan, pedoman ini akan menghilangkan dana baru. Namun, terkadang pengelola dana akan pergi untuk memulai dana mereka sendiri dan walaupun dana itu baru, kinerja manajer dapat dilacak untuk jangka waktu yang lebih lama. Investasi Minimum: Kriteria ini sangat penting bagi investor yang lebih kecil karena banyak dana memiliki minimum yang dapat mempersulit diversifikasi dengan benar. Investasi minimal dana juga bisa memberi indikasi jenis investor dalam dana tersebut. Minimum yang lebih besar mungkin mengindikasikan proporsi investor institusional yang lebih tinggi, sementara minimum minimum mungkin mengindikasikan jumlah investor individual yang lebih banyak. Persyaratan Penebusan: Persyaratan ini memiliki implikasi terhadap likuiditas dan menjadi sangat penting bila portofolio keseluruhan sangat tidak likuid. Periode lock-up yang lebih lama lebih sulit digabungkan ke dalam portofolio, dan periode penebusan lebih dari satu bulan dapat menghadirkan beberapa tantangan selama proses pengelolaan portofolio. Sebuah panduan dapat diimplementasikan untuk menghilangkan dana yang memiliki penguncian saat portofolio sudah tidak likuid, sementara pedoman ini mungkin akan rileks saat portofolio memiliki likuiditas yang memadai. Bagaimana Keuntungan Hedge Fund Dikontrak Ketika dana lindung nilai A. S. dalam negeri mengembalikan keuntungan kepada investornya, uang tersebut dikenai pajak capital gain. Tingkat capital gain jangka pendek berlaku untuk laba atas investasi yang dimiliki kurang dari satu tahun, dan sama dengan tingkat pajak investor terhadap pendapatan biasa. Untuk investasi yang diadakan lebih dari satu tahun, tarifnya tidak lebih dari 15 untuk sebagian besar pembayar pajak, tapi bisa mencapai 20 di dalam kurung pajak tinggi. Pajak ini berlaku bagi AS dan investor asing. Dana lindung nilai luar negeri didirikan di luar Amerika Serikat, biasanya di negara dengan pajak rendah atau bebas pajak. Ia menerima investasi dari investor asing dan entitas A. S. yang bebas pajak. Investor ini tidak menanggung kewajiban pajak A. S. atas keuntungan yang didistribusikan. Cara Hedge Funds Hindari Membayar Pajak Banyak hedge fund terstruktur untuk mengambil keuntungan dari bunga yang dibawa. Di bawah struktur ini, dana diperlakukan sebagai kemitraan. Para pendiri dan pengelola dana adalah mitra umum, sementara para investor adalah mitra terbatas. Para pendiri juga memiliki perusahaan manajemen yang menjalankan hedge fund. Para manajer memperoleh 20 biaya kinerja dari bunga yang diajukan sebagai mitra umum dana tersebut. Manajer hedge fund dikompensasikan dengan bunga yang dibawa ini pendapatan mereka dari dana tersebut dikenai pajak sebagai imbal hasil investasi dibandingkan dengan gaji atau kompensasi untuk layanan yang diberikan. Biaya insentif dikenakan pajak pada tingkat keuntungan modal jangka panjang 20 dibandingkan dengan tarif pajak penghasilan biasa, di mana tingkat suku bunga tertinggi adalah 39,6. Ini merupakan penghematan pajak yang signifikan bagi manajer hedge fund. Pengaturan bisnis ini memiliki kritik, yang mengatakan bahwa struktur adalah celah yang memungkinkan dana lindung nilai untuk menghindari pembayaran pajak. Aturan kepentingan yang diusung belum dibatalkan meski ada banyak usaha di Kongres. Ini menjadi isu utama selama pemilihan utama 2016. Banyak hedge fund terkemuka menggunakan bisnis reasuransi di Bermuda sebagai cara lain untuk mengurangi kewajiban pajak mereka. Bermuda tidak membebankan pajak penghasilan badan. Jadi hedge fund mendirikan perusahaan reasuransi mereka sendiri di Bermuda. Dana lindung nilai kemudian mengirim uang ke perusahaan reasuransi di Bermuda. Reasuradur ini Pada gilirannya, menginvestasikan dana tersebut kembali ke dana lindung nilai. Setiap keuntungan dari dana lindung nilai masuk ke reasuradur di Bermuda, di mana mereka tidak memiliki pajak penghasilan perusahaan. Keuntungan dari investasi hedge fund tumbuh tanpa kewajiban pajak. Pajak hanya terutang begitu investor menjual sahamnya di reasuradur. Bisnis di Bermuda harus menjadi bisnis asuransi. Jenis bisnis lainnya kemungkinan akan menimbulkan denda dari Dinas Pendapatan Internal A. S. (IRS) untuk perusahaan investasi asing pasif. IRS mendefinisikan asuransi sebagai bisnis yang aktif. Untuk memenuhi syarat sebagai bisnis yang aktif, perusahaan reasuransi tidak dapat memiliki kumpulan modal yang jauh lebih besar daripada yang dibutuhkan untuk mengembalikan asuransi yang ia jual. Tidak jelas apa standar ini, karena belum didefinisikan oleh IRS. Hedge Fund Controversies Sejumlah hedge fund telah terlibat dalam skandal insider trading sejak 2008. Dua kasus insider trading paling terkenal melibatkan Grup Galleon yang dikelola oleh Raj Rajaratnam dan SAC Capital yang dikelola oleh Steven Cohen. Galleon Group mengelola lebih dari 7 miliar pada puncaknya sebelum dipaksa untuk tutup pada tahun 2009. Perusahaan ini didirikan pada tahun 1997 oleh Raj Rajaratnam. Pada tahun 2009, jaksa federal menuduh Rajaratnam dengan banyak tuduhan melakukan kecurangan dan perdagangan orang dalam. Dia dinyatakan bersalah atas 14 tuduhan di tahun 2011 dan mulai menjalani hukuman 11 tahun. Banyak karyawan Galleon Group juga terbukti bersalah dalam skandal tersebut. Rajaratnam ditangkap karena mendapat informasi orang dalam dari Rajat Gupta, anggota dewan Goldman Sachs. Sebelum berita tersebut dipublikasikan, Gupta diduga menyampaikan informasi bahwa Warren Buffett melakukan investasi di Goldman Sachs pada September 2008 pada saat puncak krisis keuangan. Rajaratnam dapat membeli sejumlah besar saham Goldman Sachs dan menghasilkan keuntungan yang lumayan untuk saham tersebut dalam satu hari. Rajaratnam juga dinyatakan bersalah atas tuduhan insider trading lainnya. Sepanjang masa jabatannya sebagai manajer investasi, dia melatih sekelompok orang dalam industri untuk mendapatkan akses ke informasi material. Steven Cohen dan hedge fund-nya, SAC Capital, juga terlibat dalam skandal perdagangan orang dalam yang berantakan. SAC Capital mengelola sekitar 50 miliar pada puncaknya. SEC menggerebek empat perusahaan investasi yang dijalankan oleh mantan pedagang SAC Capital pada tahun 2010. Selama beberapa tahun berikutnya, SEC mengajukan sejumlah tuntutan pidana terhadap mantan pedagang SAC Capital. Mathew Martoma, mantan manajer portofolio SAC Capital, dinyatakan bersalah atas tuduhan insider trading yang diduga menghasilkan lebih dari 276 juta keuntungan untuk SAC. Dia memperoleh informasi orang dalam tentang uji coba klinis FDA terhadap obat Alzheimer yang kemudian diperdagangkan oleh SAC Capital. Steven Cohen secara individu tidak pernah menghadapi tuntutan pidana. Sebaliknya, SEC mengajukan tuntutan perdata melawan SAC Capital karena gagal mengawasi para pedagangnya dengan benar. Departemen Kehakiman mengajukan dakwaan pidana terhadap hedge fund untuk penipuan sekuritas dan penipuan kawat. SAC Capital setuju untuk menyelesaikan semua tuntutan terhadapnya dengan mengaku bersalah dan membayar denda 1,2 miliar. Dana lindung nilai lebih lanjut sepakat untuk berhenti mengelola uang dari luar. Namun, sebuah penyelesaian pada bulan Januari 2016 membatalkan larangan seumur hidup Cohens untuk mengelola uang dan akan membiarkan dia mengelola uang dalam dua tahun, dapat ditinjau oleh konsultan independen dan ujian SEC. Peraturan Baru untuk Hedge Funds Dana Hedge begitu besar dan kuat sehingga SEC mulai memperhatikan lebih dekat, terutama karena pelanggaran seperti perdagangan orang dalam dan penipuan tampaknya terjadi lebih sering. Namun, tindakan baru-baru ini benar-benar melonggarkan cara hedge fund dapat memasarkan kendaraan mereka ke investor. Pada bulan Maret 2012, Jumpstart Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) ditandatangani menjadi undang-undang. Premis dasar dari JOBS Act adalah untuk mendorong pendanaan usaha kecil di A. S. dengan mengurangi peraturan efek. JOBS Act juga memiliki dampak besar pada dana lindung nilai: Pada bulan September 2013, larangan iklan hedge fund dicabut. Dalam pemungutan suara 4 banding 1, SEC menyetujui sebuah mosi untuk mengizinkan dana lindung nilai dan perusahaan lain yang membuat penawaran pribadi untuk diiklankan kepada siapapun yang mereka inginkan, namun mereka tetap hanya dapat menerima investasi dari investor yang terakreditasi. Hedge fund seringkali merupakan pemasok utama modal untuk perusahaan pemula dan usaha kecil karena lintang investasi mereka yang luas. Pemberian dana lindung nilai kesempatan untuk meminta modal akan membantu pertumbuhan usaha kecil dengan meningkatkan jumlah modal investasi yang tersedia. Periklanan hedge fund memerlukan penawaran produk investasi dana kepada investor terakreditasi atau perantara keuangan melalui media cetak, televisi dan internet. Dana lindung nilai yang ingin diminta (diiklankan ke) investor harus mengajukan Formulir D dengan SEC setidaknya 15 hari sebelum mulai beriklan. Karena iklan hedge fund dilarang keras sebelum mencabut larangan ini, SEC sangat tertarik dengan bagaimana iklan digunakan oleh emiten swasta. Sehingga telah membuat perubahan pada pengajuan D Formulir. Dana yang melakukan penawaran publik juga perlu mengajukan Formulir D yang telah diubah dalam waktu 30 hari setelah penghentian penawaran. Gagal mengikuti peraturan ini kemungkinan akan menghasilkan pelarangan untuk menciptakan sekuritas tambahan selama setahun atau lebih. Zero Hedge Posted by Tyler Durden at 12:21 AM Dear Zero Hedge pembaca dan penggemar blogger, sekarang saatnya untuk melanjutkan. Untuk blogger berusia di atas 6 bulan telah melayani kami dengan baik, namun hal itu sampai pada keterbatasannya beberapa waktu yang lalu. Situs baru kami Selain semua fitur yang ada saat ini, kini sudah memiliki RSS feed penuh. Bagian Kontributor, Glosarium istilah lengkap. Dan Forum penuh untuk konten yang diinisiasi oleh pembaca, dan setelah periode pengujian beta satu bulan, sekarang berfungsi penuh (belum lagi lebih cepat). Dan ini hanya permulaan - arsitektur fleksibel dari situs baru ini telah memungkinkan kami mengembangkan beberapa fitur baru yang sangat keren yang akan kami luncurkan dalam beberapa minggu ini. Kami sangat gembira dengan ini. Kami akan menyimpan blogger sampai saat googleblogger memutuskan untuk mematikannya: ini akan menjadi repositori sekitar 2.600 posting di sini sejak 9 Januari. Ke depan, tidak ada lagi posting yang akan diunggah ke blogger. Selain itu, situs ini akan dipelihara sebagai situs blog cadangan jika terjadi kegagalan infrastruktur yang tak terduga di zerohedge Pembaca yang ingin terus mengikuti analisis, laporan, presentasi, dan pendapat kami dengan hormat diundang untuk mengunjungi kami di zerohedge. Anda akan menemukan rumah baru yang sangat ramah. Sementara itu menyedihkan saya untuk meninggalkan blogger, sekarang saatnya untuk beralih ke tahap berikutnya dari proyek. Tandai posting ini dengan: Senin, 27 Juli 2009 Diposkan oleh Tyler Durden di 06:27 Hei Ron, tidak menyadari posisi baru Anda sebagai penyumbang editor di CNBC hadir dengan judul Portfolio Manager yang berkontribusi. Bukankah Stevie menaruh kibbosh satu tahun untuk itu Tapi aku ngelantur. Dan dalam semua kejujuran saya terkejut bahwa Anda tampaknya memiliki putaran yang benar pada hal-hal (seperti per huruf di bawah ini dari Jim Cramers gagal dalam eksperimen media TheStreet). Bila Anda mengatakan: Id lebih suka regulator melihat apakah perusahaan seperti Goldman Sachs (GS) secara tidak adil melihat ketertiban dan arus informasi seiring dengan pelanggan dan kliennya. Kami sangat terkejut Namun saat Anda menindaklanjutinya dengan mengatakan: Tapi pers tidak akan menyentuh topik itu, kami benar-benar gembira karena Anda tidak memasukkan kita ke dalam definisi kata penghinaan itu. Kemudian lagi, jangan ragu untuk mencari Goldman Sachs di sini. Bahkan seorang manajer portofolio terpelajar seperti diri Anda mungkin bisa belajar satu atau dua hal. The New York Times dan The Wall Street Journal sedang membidik bentuk baru perdagangan terkomputerisasi yang dikenal dengan perdagangan Frekuensi Tinggi. Perdagangan berbasis algoritma diduga merupakan bentuk ilegal dari front-running, karena pedagang dengan frekuensi tinggi menggaet komputer pertukaran dan menggunakan perdagangan flash untuk mengeluarkan arus pesanan masuk dan menggunakan kecepatan kilat program mereka sendiri untuk melompat di depan pesanan pelanggan. Kritikus berpendapat bahwa investor individu berada pada posisi yang berbeda untuk alasan ini dan beragam lainnya. Kedekatan komputer dengan frekuensi tinggi, yang dapat ditempatkan di sebelah komputer bertukar dengan biaya tertentu, memungkinkan terjadinya transfer informasi yang hampir osmotik. Senator Charles Schumer (D, N. Y.) meminta SEC untuk melarang perdagangan kilat, yang merupakan perintah palsu yang dilakukan oleh program frekuensi tinggi yang bertujuan untuk mengelabui pelaku pasar agar masuk dalam pesanan. Program melompat di depan pesanan pelanggan dan mendapatkan keuntungan trading. Jika memang itulah yang terjadi, itu memenuhi syarat sebagai jalan depan, praktik ilegal di Wall Street. Jika pedagang dengan frekuensi tinggi hanya lebih cepat dari orang lain dan tidak secara tidak sah melompat ke depan orang lain atau membayar pertukaran untuk mendapatkan perlakuan perdagangan istimewa, maka area baru perdagangan berbasis teknologi ini tidak kalah sahnya daripada penggunaan telegraf, Telepon, ticker, komputer, perangkat genggam atau kotak hitam bergaya lama atau program kolam gelap yang memberi para pedagang canggih kemampuan untuk sekadar berdagang lebih cepat. Id lebih suka regulator melihat apakah perusahaan seperti Goldman Sachs (GS) - yang mantan eksekutifnya terus menjalankan New York Stock Exchange (NYX) menasehati merger antara NYSE dan Archipelago, dan sebelumnya memiliki sebagian dari gabungan entitas itu sendiri. Speer. Leeds amp Kellogg, perusahaan spesialis terbesar di lantai Big Board dan mengendalikan jumlah kursi terbanyak di pasar ekuitas - melihat secara tidak adil ketertiban dan arus informasi di depan pelanggan dan kliennya. Saya jauh lebih mementingkan hal itu daripada saya tentang kemunculan perdagangan frekuensi tinggi. Tapi pers tidak akan menyentuh topik itu. Ini lebih mudah untuk mengejar spekulan yang ditakuti dan pedagang renang gelap daripada kehilangan akses ke perusahaan paling menguntungkan dan bergengsi di Wall Street. Bookmark this post with: Posted by Tyler Durden at 5:13 PM After numerous posts on this blog discussing speculation of assorted forced buy ins, it seems that this phenomenon is quite factual and quite pervasive among the asset management community. As Zero Hedge has noted previously, forced buy-ins are a critical issue as it leaves shorts at the mercy of their securities lenders and repo desks (most of which are TARP recipients and thus beneficiaries of higher stock prices) which generically have the option of recalling lent out shares at a moments notice, and thus creatingartificial purchasing pressure: i. e. a forced short squeeze. According to Securities Industry News. in a recent survey by Callan Associates, over half of the respondents said they are undergoing a controlled unwind with their securities lending desks (aka State Street, BoNY. and Northern Trust). Firms participating in securities lending programs are trying to reduce their risks and push for greater disclosure of what happens to cash given as collateral, according to a survey released this week by Callan Associates, a San Francisco-based investment consulting firm. About half of the respondents to the Callan survey said they are undergoing a process called 8220controlled unwind8221 to reduce the risks in their existing securities lending programs and minimize current and future losses. Properly executed, an unwind involves recalling securities out on loan without incurring any financial loss or restricting either the number of transactions or the types of securities lent. Almost all the respondents are using their current custodian or securities lending provider for the unwind and most believe it will take one to three years to complete, said Callan. More than half of the 44 respondents who said they wanted to make changes to their securities lending programs rank fine-tuning their cash collateral reinvestment guidelines as their top priority. This reflects a common concern among respondents about losses coming from the reinvesting of cash used as collateral against the securities that are lent out. The firm surveyed 72 fund and plan sponsor organizations of which public and corporate funds comprised the majority of survey respondents. About 54 percent of the respondents were mid-sized funds that hold from 1 billion to 9 billion in fund assets. Nineteen percent of the respondents were small funds with less than 1 billion. The remaining respondents were split between 8220mega8221 funds with more than 25 billion in assets and large funds with between 10 billion and 24 billion in assets. Bottom line - in a market where an unknown but significant amount of trading is based on widely permitted and pervasive advanced looks compliments of the exchanges, ECNs and the regulators, and the balance consists of artificial buying from rolling buyins. only the most insane, or foolhardy or both, believe they can trade with any hope of short or long-term success. Bookmark this post with: Posted by Tyler Durden at 2:29 PM It seems only yesterday that Zero Hedge had some questions in regard to Goldmans VaR Fed exemption. No response was received from 85 Broad. Today it appears several Congressmen, lead by Alan Grayson, are willing to drive a sharp stick pretty deep into the hornets nest, by sending a letter directly to Wall Street Don Ben Bernanke. demanding an explanation exactly to the question of Goldmans VaR Exemption. Among the reasons provided as casue for potential alarm are the following: 1) In the letter granting a regulatory exemption to Goldman Sachs, you stated that the SEC-approved VaR models it is now using are sufficiently conservative for the transition period to bank holding company. Please justify this statement. 2) If Goldman Sachs were required to adhere to standard Market Risk Rules imposed by the Federal Reserve on ordinary bank holding companies, how would its capital requirements differ from the current regulatory regime 3) What is the difference in exposure to the taxpayer between these two regulatory regimes 4) What is the difference in total risk to the portfolio between these two regulatory regimes 5) Goldman Sachs stated that 8220As of June 26, 2009, total capital was 254.05 billion, consisting of 62.81 billion in total shareholders8217 equity (common shareholders8217 equity of 55.86 billion and preferred stock of 6.96 billion) and 191.24 billion in unsecured long-term borrowings.8221 As a percentage of capital, that8217s a lot of long-term unsecured debt. Is any of this coming from the Government In this last quarter, how much capital has Goldman Sachs received from the Federal Reserve and other government facilities such as FDIC-guaranteed debt, either directly or indirectly 6) Many risk-management experts, most notably best-selling author Nassim Taleb, note that VaR models can dramatically understate risk. What is your overall view of Taleb8217s argument, and of the utility of Value-at-Risk models as regulatory tools Zero Hedge had a rather comparable battery of questions. and believes it would be in the general interest of whatever remains of the general investing public, the one that for some reason or another still has not lost all faith in a fair and efficient marketplace, compliments of several major monopolists who have usurped exchanges and ECN as their personal taxpayer and speculator funded piggy banks. Bookmark this post with: Posted by Cornelius at 2:09 PM Some interesting stuff in John Mauldins latest piece. Well include some pertinent quotes along with our thoughts. China is growing by about 8 a year, which is amazing on the surface of it, as their exports are down about 20 (more in some sectors). How can that be I continually read about how China is going to lead the world out of its global funk. And 8 growth in GDP does seem pretty strong. But we need to look a little deeper. If I told you that the next US stimulus package would be 4.5 trillion dollars, mostly given to banks that would be forced to loan out the money quickly, do you think that might jump spending and GDP in the short term Would you start looking for a few bubbles to be created What about the dollar That is the equivalent of what China is now doing. The volume of credit that is flowing into China is equivalent to one-third of their GDP. Banks that already have large problem-loan portfolios are now lending even more, in a very short time frame. China has severe capacity-utilization problems, as trade has sharply fallen and the US consumer is unlikely to return to anywhere near the level of consumption that was the case in 2006. The Chinese stock market is up 85 this year, and commodity and real estate prices are rising. And no wonder: the money supply shot up 28.5 in June alone. That money is looking for a home. My friend Vitaliy Katsenelson has written a very perceptive essay for Foreign Policy magazine, talking about the nature of the current growth in China. But dont confuse fast growth with sustainable growth. Much of Chinas growth over the past decade has come from lending to the United States. The country suffers from real overcapacity. And now growth comes from borrowing -- and hundreds of billion-dollar decisions made on the fly dont inspire a lot of confidence. For example, a nearly completed, 13-story building in Shanghai collapsed in June due to the poor quality of its construction. This growth will result in a huge pile of bad debt -- as forced lending is bad lending. The list of negative consequences is very long, but the bottom line is simple: There is no miracle in the Chinese miracle growth, and China will pay a price. The only question is when and how much. This is very much in line with our theme of the recent China bubble. John has done a much better job in attaching specific numbers and analogies to the situation but the fundamental picture aligns with many of our posts going back to April. The larger view has not changed and the question becomes if China can complete this transition before the legs give out. The US can not be expected to provide the bubble year levels of aggregate demand that has created and supported the existing Chinese manufacturing and employment infrastructure. I am going to quote at some length from Simon Hunts latest note. He travels very frequently to China and is one of the worlds true experts on the copper market. If you want to know something about copper, ask Simon. Copper, we are told, is the metal with a PhD in economics. If copper prices are rising, then the economy is booming. And historically, that has more or less been the case. But there may be reason to believe that PhD may be no more useful this time around than a regular Ivy League degree. There is no better example of this speculative activity than what is being seen in the copper market. It is easy for global merchants, hedge funds etc to ship cathode into China and warehouse it outside the reporting system, so fuelling investors sentiments that copper demand in China is soaring and at the same time draining copper from the rest of the market. It is not so much industry which is doing this buying in China, but individuals, financial institutions and even small companies divorced from the copper industry who are buying and holding the metal because copper is a store of value and prices will go up is the common response. We updated our numbers for the first half of this year. They are truly staggering. Over 1 million tonnes of cathode is sitting in China mostly outside the reporting system as a punt on rising prices. (Emphasis mine) If it is happening in copper it is likely to be happening in other commodity markets as well. If you are trading the metals, you should be aware that a quick drop could happen if demand falls off due to there being a glut of supply coming back onto the market. This is another long-term theme that we have been exploring. Again, John does a much better job of providing specifics to back up our original assertions. We dont know who Simon Hunt is but if John asserts that he is a true expert, well take his word for it. This piece we put up covers most of our thoughts on the subject, so we wont rehash but it is an ongoing story with the potential to have some serious impacts across global markets. This is a very big deal, and from the Chinese point of view, quite smart. Right now they are stuck with 2 trillion in US Treasuries, agency paper, etc. They cant sell their dollars without really hurting the dollar, thereby forcing the renminbi to rise and hurting their own exports. But they, and much of the world, feel that the US is pursuing policies that are going to be harmful to the value of the dollar and therefore to Chinas largest reserve exposure. What to do Take those dollars and buy physical assets. Companies, natural resources, maybe a few small countries. (To my Chinese readers: thats a joke, although some in the West worry about that.) In the card game called Old Maid we played as kids, the loser was the one who ended up with the Old Maid at the end of the game. For the past decade, the Chinese sent us stuff and we sent them dollars in the form of electrons. They in turn invested those dollars in our debt so we could buy more stuff. It was a form of vendor financing. And now the Chinese have apparently decided to pass the Old Maid of the dollar on to other parties, who will sell them their assets for dollars. Seriously, did anyone not think they would do this Massively selling the dollar, which so many conspiracy-theory types keep saying they will, was never really a rational option. But using those dollars to acquire productive assets Very smart, very rational. If you figure out what they want to buy and get there first, there are profits to be had. Attention should be paid. This is an interesting point. Many have picked up on this point previously but most have assumed those asset flows are going to be into commodities. We disagree mostly because of the numbers involved (2.2T is a hell of a lot of commodities) but John explicitly defines the agenda of overseas acquisition, including commodities, equities and any other real assets China can get its hands on. On a quick tangent, the implications for inflation-protected or - hedged assets are huge. Specific equity sectors are likely to see flows go through the roof - well leave it to our readers to discuss in the comments. Notice in the chart below that unemployment continued to rise until the first quarter of 2003. And that is also when the stock market took off. Those who see green shoots need to think about that. Meanwhile, the market is clearly telling us that it sees nothing but blue skies in the future. I truly marvel at this rally, but I continue to think it is a bear-market rally. The weakest, high-beta names are rallying the most. This rally does not seem to be the basis for a sustained bull market. That being said, Richard Russell has removed the bear from his letter and put in a bull. I may be the last bear standing. Nothing new here for regular ZH readers but its almost comical in the simplicity of the argument. People arent employed. Unemployed people dont spend money. Not spending money means no green shoots. Forget second derivatives, revised seasonally adjusted housing numbers or Dennis Kneales belief in the power of the smiley face. This is going to be a long, jobless recovery. Hours worked per week are at an all-time low. As noted above, part-time work is very high. Employers, when things actually start to turn around, and they will, will first give current employees more hours and then expand the hours of part-time workers. There will be few new jobs for a long time. Because our population is growing, between 130-150,000 new jobs are required each month to keep unemployment from rising. Initial and continuing claims suggest we are currently losing at least 300,000 a month. (As an aside, the media talks about initial unemployment claims falling. That is actually not true. Unemployment claims are in fact quite high and rising, but the seasonal adjustments make them look smaller. Normally, this would not be a big deal. But the summer seasonal adjustment assumes a normal automobile manufacturing market, with layoffs in July. The layoffs came much earlier this year, distorting seasonal adjustments.) Higher and persistent unemployment, lower incomes and wages, higher savings rates, capacity utilization at 50-year lows and still falling, rising home foreclosures, a deleveraging financial system, etc. are not the stuff of V-shaped recoveries. Throw in that Moodys estimates that US banks will have to write off 400 billion in 2010, and its a very weak recovery indeed that shapes up for next year. Not to rehash, but John again does a great job of tacking on numbers to a scenario we have been covering for a while. Investors hoping to recoup their losses from the bubble burst in short order are in for a surprise. Overall, a good reading piece to ruminate on over the weekend. Bookmark this post with: Posted by Tyler Durden at 1:22 PM Must read: Fast-on-the-draw trades need spot of marshalling (FT. ht Joe) Roubini Op-Ed on Bernanke: The Great Preventer (NYT ) Lennar signals fleeting buildling rally as buyers flee (Bloomberg ) JP Morgan to raise banker salaries (FT ) The man spreading false rumors about Harman and Textron takeovers (that fooled fast-moneys Najarian) found dead in suicide (Bloomberg ) Chinese steel executive beaten to death, (FT ) Alan Abelson: It could be worse (Barrons ) Real homes of genius: The California housing collapse deconstructed (Dr Housing Bubble ) Rally may cool on earnings reality check (Reuters ) California officials worried about new budget woes (BusinessWeek ) US probe targets UBS banker visits (Reuters ) Phibro trader Andrew Hall is holding Citi hostage over 100 million pay package (WSJ ) Who caused the economic crisis: an email debate between Simon Johnson and Goldmans John Tablott (Salon part 1. part 2 and part 3 ) Sphere: Related ContentBookmark this post with: Posted by Tyler Durden at 12:59 AM When the former head of product development in the electronic client solutions group at none other than JP Morgan, Carl Carrie, was last quoted on Zero Hedge. he had some very nasty words for High Frequency Trading. Today, in a podcast transcript by algotradingpodcast Carl shares much more light in just why any reform movement against HFT and PT in general will be met by a huge pushback by exchanges, brokers, infrastructure providers, telcos, and all derivative market players: Clearly, algorithmic trading is a huge factor. High-frequency trading for Arbitrages, indexes, ADRs, pairs, ETFs, interlisted trading, as well as automation around auto-working, have all been factors contributing to the growth of algorithmic trading and trading on exchanges. The exchanges themselves have also been contributing factors. Theyve invested heavily in capacity and throughput. And the allocations of assets to European equities has also been a minor factor. Carl also touches on another, so far undiscussed issue - the industrial oligopoly and the economies of scale advantages to the select few: In the electronic trading space, youre seeing the beginnings of a fallout, and youre seeing larger scale players, some of them become clear winners. Not that they can permanently sustain their competitive advantage, but for a period of time, there is an economic advantage in being the preeminent, top scale player, and probably the next two rungs below. Hey Christine Varney - if you can look away from Google for longer than 10 seconds, maybe you can focus on where the next real fight for monopoly is ocurring, with materially greater consequences than Firefox being bundled in with Windows 7. Most notably, Carl discusses the emerging risk types with this new technology. Not surprisingly as Joe Saluzzi would attest, and much to the chagrin of program trading specialist Irene Aldridge. the key risk is liquidity, and much more so to the downside, i. e. when it disappears. There are new risk types. I think, it used to be about timing cost and market impact. Those were two twin pillars that most algorithmic trading has been based on. And I think, if you look at whats happened recently in the credit markets, it hasnt opened our eyes to liquidity risk, but liquidity cost and liquidity risk is perhaps a different animal. Its not just about price volatility. Its about volume volatility. Its about timing of that volume volatility. It may be there today, and when you want to get out of your position, it may not be there tomorrow. And how do you reflect that into your own trading and into, not just your alpha generation, but on the risk side of the alpha generation Most risk models dont really take into consideration the kinds of anomalies that we may see on a yearly basis. Its not a Six Sigma event, typically, that happens when we have a liquidity crisis. And a liquidity crisis very easily moves across from one market, as a class, to another. So, youve got this contagion correlation effect thats massive. So, I think, its important for all of us to develop new science and new tactics to really deal with that. And particularly, as you talk about emerging markets, theres no sphere that is as liquidity-sensitive as emerging markets is. Curiously, when Carl left JPM his parting letter had this to say: Yes, I love equities but I think the biggest transformation in the market over the next couple of years will be in the OTC fixed income, credit and commodity markets that are both begging for more liquidity and transparency and are ripe for a major transformation. I want to be there at the genesis of that transformation. We at Zero Hedge completely agree with this statement and will be presenting some of our extended ideas on this matter over the next several weeks. Bookmark this post with:SEC Charges Hedge Fund Icon Leon Cooperman With Insider Trading When it rains - for hedge fund managers, it pours - If its not lack of alpha, its insider trading. Moments ago, the SEC charged iconic hedge fund manager, Omega Advisors Leon Cooperman with insider trading, accusing him of generating substantial illicit profits by purchasing securities in Atlas Pipeline Partners (APL) in advance of the sale of its natural gas processing facility in Elk City, Oklahoma. The SEC adds that Cooperman allegedly used his status as one of APLs largest shareholders to gain access to the executive and obtain confidential details about the sale of this substantial company asset. Cooperman and Omega Advisors allegedly accumulated APL securities despite explicitly agreeing not to use the material nonpublic information for trading purposes, and when APL publicly announced the asset sale its stock price jumped more than 31 percent . According to the SECs complaint, when Omega Advisors received a subpoena nearly a year-and-half later about its trading in APL securities, Cooperman contacted the executive and tried to fabricate a story to tell if questioned about this trading activity. The executive was shocked and angered when he learned that Cooperman traded in advance of the public announcement. The SECs complaint further charges Cooperman with failing to timely report information about holdings and transactions in securities of publicly-traded companies that he beneficially owned, alleging that he violated federal securities laws more than 40 times in this regard. Looks like Leon wont be making an Ira Sohn or CNBC appearance conferences in the near future. The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged hedge fund manager Leon G. Cooperman and his firm Omega Advisors with insider trading based on material nonpublic information he learned in confidence from a corporate executive. The SEC alleges that Cooperman generated substantial illicit profits by purchasing securities in Atlas Pipeline Partners (APL) in advance of the sale of its natural gas processing facility in Elk City, Oklahoma . Cooperman allegedly used his status as one of APLs largest shareholders to gain access to the executive and obtain confidential details about the sale of this substantial company asset. Cooperman and Omega Advisors allegedly accumulated APL securities despite explicitly agreeing not to use the material nonpublic information for trading purposes, and when APL publicly announced the asset sale its stock price jumped more than 31 percent. According to the SECs complaint, when Omega Advisors received a subpoena nearly a year-and-half later about its trading in APL securities, Cooperman contacted the executive and tried to fabricate a story to tell if questioned about this trading activity. The executive was shocked and angered when he learned that Cooperman traded in advance of the public announcement. We allege that hedge fund manager Cooperman, who as a large APL shareholder obtained access to confidential corporate information, abused that access by trading on this information, said Andrew J. Ceresney, Director of the SECs Division of Enforcement. By doing so, he allegedly undermined the public confidence in the securities markets and took advantage of other investors who did not have this information. The SECs complaint further charges Cooperman with failing to timely report information about holdings and transactions in securities of publicly-traded companies that he beneficially owned, alleging that he violated federal securities laws more than 40 times in this regard. The SECs complaint was filed in federal district court in Philadelphia and seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus interest, penalties, and permanent injunctions against Cooperman and Omega Advisors as well as an officer-and-director bar against Cooperman. Here is the chronology of events laid out by the SEC: APL Negotiated the Sale of its Elk City Operating Facilities By mid-2010, APL had been experiencing financial difficulties. Though its stated principle objective was to generate cash for distribution to its shareholders, APL had not declared a cash dividend for the fiscal quarters ending June 30, 2009 through June 30, 2010. By May 2010, APL had announced to the market that it intended to improve its balance sheet in order to reinstitute a distribution to APL shareholders. On May 18, 2010, Enbridge Energy Partners, L. P. (Enbridge) made a confidential, nonbinding offer to purchase APL s Elk City operating facilities for 720 million. Elk City was a significant APL asset, which included 800 miles ofnatural gas gathering pipeline, a hydrogen sulfide treating plant, and three cryogenic processing plants, with a total capacity of approximately 370 million cubic feet ofnatural gas per day and a combined natural gas liquid production of20,000 barrels per day. Subsequently, APL retained financial and legal advisors, and the parties conducted due diligence and negotiated the terms ofa possible agreement. From May through July 2010, Enbridge and APL conducted these negotiations pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. Dwing this time period, APL s executives evaluated the financial impact ofselling Elk City at various prices from 550 million to 720 million. APL advised personnel working on the Elk City sale that information regarding the potential sale was material nonpublic information and that trading on the information would violate APLs insider trading policy. By July 7, 2010, APL had taken additional steps to ensure secrecy ofthe Elk City negotiation, including using code names and entering into confidentiality agreements with potential counterparties. APL s board ofdirectors discussed the potential Elk City transaction during a nonpublic meeting on June 18, 2010. By the morning ofJuly 7, 2010, APLs board ofdirectors planned to consider the sale ofElk City at the boards July 27, 2010 meeting. On July 19, 2010, APL agreed to sell Elk City to Enbridge for approximately 680 million, subject to approval by the companies respective boards ofdirectors and the finalization ofdeal documentation. On July 27, 2010, the respective boards ofdirectors ofAPL and Enbridge approved the Elk City sale. The next morning, on July 28, 2010, APL publicly announced that it had entered into an agreement to sell Elk City for 682 million in cash. APL stated that the asset sale would enable the company to: (a) eliminate virtually all ofits senior secured debt and significantly deleverage its balance sheet (b) allow APL to reinstate distributions to shareholders and ( c) allow APL to participate in its Marcellus Shale gathering venture. That day, APLs share price increased by 3.87 or approximately 31.3, closing at 16.22 per share. The price ofAPLs bonds and other APL-related securities also increased significantly as a result ofAPL s public announcement ofthe Elk City sale. Cooperman Was One of APLs Largest Shareholders and Had Great Influence and Access at APL By July 2010, Cooperman had been a hedge fund manager for a number of years. One strategy Cooperman employed was to accumulate large positions in publicly-traded companies and develop close relationships with those companies senior executives. Cooperman employed this strategy with APL. According to a statement he filed with the Commission, as ofDecember 31, 2009, Cooperman was the beneficial owner ofover nine percent ofAPLs common stock, worth approximately 46 million. By mid-2010, Cooperman had developed close relationships with APLs senior executives. As a result ofhis APL ownership and status, Cooperman had a level ofaccess to APLs executives that was not available to APLs smaller shareholders. Through this access, Cooperman had numerous telephone conversations and meetings with APL executives. During the first half of 2010, Cooperman reduced his stake in APL, by, among other things, directing accounts he controlled to sell APL stock worth millions ofdollars. Indeed, until July 7, 2010, there was no day in 2010 on which the Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts, Managed Accounts and Family Accounts collectively were net buyers of APL common stock, call options or bonds. In an April 30, 2010 email, Cooperman stated that he was scaling out of APL on strength. The Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts, Managed Accounts and Family Accounts did not t. rade APL stock, options or bonds in the six weeks prior to July 7, 2010. On July 7, 2010, Cooperman expressed to Omega Consultant that APL was a shitty business. In July 2010, Cooperman Misappropriated Information about the Elk City Sale from APL Executive 1 Cooperman spoke with APL Executive 1 on the telephone on July 7, 19 and 20, 2010. During these telephone conversations, APL Executive 1 informed Cooperman that APL was negotiating the sale ofElk City and Cooperman asked APL Executive 1 questions about the Elk City sale. In at least one ofthese conversations, APL Executive 1 told Cooperman that APL was selling its Elk City facility for approximately 650 million. Despite knowing that information about the Elk City sale was material nonpublic information, APL Executive 1 told Cooperman about the Elk City sale because he believed Cooperman had an obligation not to use this information to trade APL securities. Indeed, during one ofthese conversations in which APL Executive 1 told Cooperman confidential information about the Elk City sale, Cooperman explicitly agreed that he could not and would not use the confidential information APL Executive 1 told him to trade APL securities . Cooperman, however, did not abide by his agreement to maintain in confidence, and not trade on the basis of, the Elk City sale information. On July 7, 2010, Cooperman spoke to APL Executive 1 at approximately 2:06 p. m. EDT for about six minutes. Despite taking a bearish position on APL throughout the first half of 2010 and calling APL a shitty business earlier that day, after speaking to APL executive 1, Cooperman began buying APL securities. On July 7, 2010, at Coopermans and Omegas direction, the Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts and Managed Accounts purchased a total of 1,966 APL call options with a strike price of 15.00, expiring August 21, 2010. The call options purchases accounted for over 90 ofthe days trading volume in that option series . On July 7, 2010, APLs stock price closed at 9.66, and the call options the Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts and Managed Accounts purchased were significantly out-of-the-money. At Coopermans and Omegas direction, the Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts and Managed Accounts continued to purchase APL securities between July 8, 2010 and July 19, 2010. The chart below reflects these purchases: On July 19, 2010, at approximately 3:19 p. m. EDT, Cooperman spoke on the telephone with APL Executive 1, while APL Executive 1 was located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. By the time ofthis telephone conversation, APL had reached an agreement in principle to sell Elk City. APL senior executives, including APL Executive 1, were preparing for a July 27, 2010 meeting ofAPLs board ofdirectors to discuss the Elk City sale. On July 19, 2010, after his call with APL Executive 1, Cooperman created an entry on his electronic calendar for July 27, 2010 at 10:30 a. m. with the subject line APL Board Meeting. On July 20, 2010, at approximately 9:43 a. m. EDT, Cooperman spoke on the telephone with APL Executive 1 for about seven minutes, while APL Executive 1 was located in the Eastern District ofPennsylvania. Almost as soon as his call with APL Executive 1 concluded, at approximately 9:50 a. m. EDT, Cooperman called Omega Consultant on the telephone. During the telephone conversation, Cooperman told Omega Consultant that Cooperman had learned from someone at APL that APL had reached a deal to sell Elk City for 650 million. Cooperman and Omega Consultant discussed how APLs stock price would react to public disclosure ofthe Elk City sale. Omega Consultant told Cooperman that the announcement that APL was going to sell Elk City for 650 million would cause APLs stock price to increase significantly. On July 20, 2010, Cooperman and Omega directed the purchase ofmore APL securities, as follows: a. The Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts and Managed Accounts purchased a total of3,800 out-of-the-money APL call options with a strike price of15.00, expiring November 20, 2010. This activity constituted over 95 ofthe daily volume oftrading in that option series b. In an account Cooperman managed on behalf ofa minor family member, Cooperman purchased 50,000 ofAPLs 8.75 bonds due June 15, 2018 at an average price of92.75 per unit and c. The Cooperman Offshore Account purchased 61, 700 APL shares at an average price of 10.3056. On July 21, 2010, based on the material nonpublic information Cooperman told Omega Consultant, Omega Consultant incorporated a 650 million asset sale into Omega Consultants model of APLs financials, which Omega Consultant saved on Omegas computer systems. Omega Consultants revised model indicated that APLs Elk City sale would significantly enhance APLs credit standing and the companys ability to reinstitute cash distributions on an earlier-than-expected schedule and in larger-than-expected amounts. At Cooperman s and Omegas direction, the Cooperman Offshore Account, Family Accounts, Hedge Fund Accounts and Managed Accounts continued to purchase APL securities between July 21, 2010 and July 27, 2010. The chart below reflects these purchases: The July 21, 2010 purchase of3,021 APL call options with a strike price of 17.50, expiring August 21, 2010, made up the entire daily volume of trading in that option series. The July 22, 2010 purchase of 1,250 APL call options with a strike price of17.50, expiring November 20, 2010, made up the entire daily volume of trading in that option series. The July 27, 2010 purchase of 500 APL call options with a strike price of17 .50, expiring November 20, 2010, made up the entire daily volume of trading in that option series. On July 22, 2010, at approximately 9:40 a. m. EDT, Cooperman called APL Executive 2s Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office telephone line. Cooperman asked APL Executive 2 about the progress ofthe Elk City sale. APL Executive 2 was surprised that Cooperman knew about the Elk City sale given that APL had taken substantial steps to keep the transaction confidential. On July 27, 2010, at approximately 7:52 p. m. EDT, Cooperman spoke on the telephone with APL Executive 1, who told Cooperman that APL s board had approved the Elk City sale. On July 27, 2010, at approximately 8:36 p. m. EDT, Cooperman sent an email to a family member, who also was a hedge fund manager, stating: Good news on APL. they sold their ELK City operation for 682mm which will enable them to pay off bank debt, de-risk company because keep whole contracts largely gone and fund their Laurel Mountain obligations. We think stock worth at least 15 in near term---for what that is worth. Coopermans family member forwarded this email to a colleague who replied, in part: That explains the fishy 17 August calls, etc. I still havent come across any press release - want to see how its discussed. Coopermans family member responded: Somebody should investigate that. On July 27, 2010 at approximately 9:20 p. m. EDT, Cooperman emailed two Omega traders, stating: APL has done a major deal and Im told there will be a call at 10:30am. Please get me dial in info. Then at 9:44 p. m. EDT on July 27, 2010, Cooperman sent an email to an Omega trader, stating: When you get in please check how much APL we could buy to get to 9.9. Depending on trading level we might add. Federal securities laws generally require a person to disclose within ten days that he has become the beneficial owner of greater than ten percent of a class ofequity securities, like APL stock. On July 28, 2010, at approximately 6:59 a. m. EDT, APL publicly announced for the first time that it was selling Elk City for 682 million. As a result, on that day, APL s stock price increased approximately 31 and other APL-related securities greatly increased in value. After this announcement, Cooperman emailed a family member stating that: minor family member will be pleased to know that the bond I bought for minor family member the other day has risen 7 in price as the company just sold some assets that resulted in an improvement oftheir credit standing. The Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts, Managed Accounts and Family Accounts generated profits ofapproximately 4.09 million by trading APL securities at Coopermans direction between July 7, 2010 and July 27, 2010. As a result ofCoopermans and Omegas unlawful conduct, at Coopermans direction, the Cooperman Offshore Account, Hedge Fund Accounts, Managed Accounts and Family Accounts made significant ill-gotten gains by trading on the basis ofmaterial nonpublic information about APL s Elk City sale. Cooperman Concealed and Then Attempted To Cover-Up His Insider Trading Cooperman carefully guarded the information he misappropriated from APL Executive 1, communicating it to Omega Consultant, but not sharing it with his family member, who was also a hedge fund manager and at times an APL investor. Indeed, on July 28, 2010, after APL announced the Elk City sale, Cooperman s hedge fund manager family member emailed APL Executive 3 twice, complaining about APL options activity prior to the public announcement ofthe Elk City sale, stating: Can you please call me Been trying to get you last few days. There had been some fishy options trades in apl sic before this that somebody should investigate. I also would like to make sure that the sec sic looks into the shady option trades and volume in apl sic last 2 weeks or so in front ofthis deal. How do I become a whistle blower APL Executive 1 was shocked and angered when he learned that Cooperman andor accounts that Cooperman managed traded in APL securities in advance ofthe public announcement ofthe Elk City sale. In late 2011 or early 2012, Cooperman spoke on the telephone with APL Executive 1. During this call, Cooperman informed APL Executive 1 that the Commission had sent Omega a subpoena relating to trading in APL securities in advance ofthe announcement of the Elk City sale. Cooperman improperly sought APL Executive 1 s assurance that APL Executive 1 had not shared confidential information with him in advance ofthe announcement of the Elk City sale, despite knowing this was not true. APL Executive 1 believed that Cooperman was attempting to fabricate a story in case the two were questioned about their conversations regarding Elk City. In late 2011, Cooperman also informed APL Executive 3 that the Commission had sent Omega a subpoena relating to APL trading in advance ofthe announcement ofthe Elk City sale. Cooperman told APL Executive 3 to tell APL Executive 1 that Cooperman and APL Executive 1 had not discussed confidential information related to the Elk City sale prior to the time APL publicly announced it. In connection with an investigation concerning Coopermans and Omegas conduct, including the trading in APL securities referenced above, the Commission issued a subpoena for Coopermans testimony. Cooperman invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to Commission questions regarding Coopermans and Omegas trading in APL securities. For those wondering, here are Omegas Top 30 stock holdings as of June 30: Full filing below (pdf ):